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he Balkans as an Idée-Force
Scholarly Projections of the Balkan Cultural Area
Diana MISHKOVA
Abstract: The bulk of literature on the Balkans which has appeared since 1989 has made a 
lot of the stereotyped Western discourse about the region during the last two centuries. Local 
production of regional discourses, on the other hand, has been usually interpreted in terms 
of internalization of or mirror reactions to the Balkan stigmata. Typically, these studies 
concentrate on journalistic and ideological discourses, while there have been few attempts at 
reconstructing the history of the concept of “Balkans” which take into account scholarly and 
disciplinary discourses. The intention of this article is to confront this void by probing into some 
of the paradigmatic conceptualizations of the region of Balkans/Southeastern Europe, which 
had originated in the region itself with regional scholars who had reflected on and attempted to 
give an answer to the question of what was “common” to and specifically “Balkan” about the 
Balkans. This historical review finally leads to question the status of the Balkans as a legitimate 
“mental map” and unit of analysis. 
Keywords: Balkans/Southeastern Europe, historical region, regionalism, nationalism, 
balkanology.
Résumé : Le corpus de littérature paru sur les Balkans depuis 1989 a fait grand cas de la 
production occidentale de stéréotypes sur la région au cours des deux derniers siècles. La 
production locale de discours régionaux a d’ailleurs généralement été interprétée en termes 
d’intériorisation et de réactions en miroir au stigmate balkanique. Typiquement, ces études se 
focalisent sur les discours journalistiques et idéologiques, tandis qu’il y a eu peu de tentatives 
pour reconstruire l’histoire du concept de « Balkans » qui prennent en compte les discours 
académiques. L’intention de cet article est de se confronter à ce manque en explorant quelques 
unes des conceptualisations de la région des Balkans ou de l’Europe du sud-est qui ont émergé 
dans la région elle-même, sous la plume d’intellectuels et d’académiques qui ont réfléchi et 
cherché à donner une réponse à la question de ce qui peut être « commun » et spécifiquement 
« balkanique » aux Balkans. Cet examen historique de la littérature mène à interroger le statut 
des Balkans comme « carte mentale » légitime et unité d’analyse pertinente.
Mots-clés : Balkans, Europe du sud-est, régionalisme, nationalisme, balkanologie.
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C apitalizing on the “critical turn” in the human and social sciences, the mass 
of literature on the Balkans which has appeared since 1989 has made a lot of the 
stereotyped Western discourse about the region during the last two centuries. Local 
production of regional discourses, on the other hand, has been usually interpreted in 
terms of internalization of or mirror reactions to the Balkan stigmata, occasionally 
succumbing to clichés of self-defense, which this Western posture has engendered 
and sustained.1 Typically, these studies concentrate on journalistic and ideological 
discourses, closely entwined with politics, and on the problem of the deinition of 
the region. In this perspective regionalization appears essentially as a political act for 
political purposes. There have been few attempts at reconstructing the history of the 
concept of the Balkans which take into account scholarly and disciplinary discourses, 
if only with the intention to gauge the interferences or divergences between the 
different modes of conceptualization. This is perhaps not surprising. The scholarly 
notion of the Balkans is likely to render a more differentiated, nuanced, mutable and 
disjointed – and as such less “usable” – picture than the one imputed by politico-
ideological constructions. Methodologically, however, the omission is strange, not 
least from the point of view of the “Orientalist” critique, focused as it is precisely on 
unraveling the knowledge-power juncture in the politics of “mental mapping.”  
The intention of this article is to confront this void by probing into some of the 
paradigmatic conceptualizations of the region of Balkans/Southeastern Europe, which 
had originated in the region itself but in relation to intellectual (and political) currents 
beyond its borders. Regional scholars, whose work will be discussed here, have more 
or less explicitly  relected on and attempted to give an answer to the question of what 
was “common” to and speciically “Balkan” about the Balkans. How widely and how 
deeply shared should the hypothetical common elements be in order to presume their 
capacity to mold a patently diverse area into a “unitary” cultural-historical region? 
Which are the distinct “Balkan” traits – geographical/geopolitical, cultural, historical 
– singling out this region from other regions and lending it a cohesive unity? Many 
Balkan social and humanist scholars had pondered or touched upon these questions – 
and over a much longer time than present-day transnationalists might make us believe. 
Their answers were conditioned by a great many factors regarding the disciplinary 
viewpoint and scholarly paradigms. Bringing this diversity and its implications to 
light would hopefully move us closer to solving the really serious issues about the 
Balkans as a legitimate “mental map” and unit of analysis.
Linguistic and ethnographic “Balkanisms” 
For a number of historical-political as well as historiographical reasons, it may be 
argued that the transnational challenge in Southeast Europe has been stronger and with 
a more tangible tradition than in other parts of Europe. The imperial frameworks which 
survived long  into the modern era, and the subsequent political problems that this 
1. On the Western discourse of ‘Balkanism’ see Todorova 1997; Goldsworthy 1998. On the local, 
mainly national, discourses mirroring these Western visions see, for example, Bakić-Hayden 1995; 
Duțu 1999; Trendafilov 1996.
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inherited cultural diversity bequeathed to the successor states, provided a distinctive 
context, where local social sciences took shape. It  also brought  the incentives to go 
beyond national borders – in the pursuit of either irredentist or conciliatory policies 
and scholarly schemes.
The challenge was at irst taken up by linguists, literary scholars, and ethnographers, 
while historians – to the extent that they ever, prior to World War II, ventured beyond 
the national framework of history – largely followed and emulated their methods. 
The period between the mid-19th and early 20th century was a time of systematic 
accumulation of “positive” “fragmented” knowledge, where the institution of the 
Landesmuseum set a “best-practice” pattern, and of a boom in the publication of 
“sources” in history, linguistics, ethnography, and archaeology. Altogether, there was 
a certain fear of and reluctance for generalizations – a prudence that was characteristic 
of the age and cultivated by positivism. Historians, in particular, basically remained 
conined to a vision of contributing with some bricks to the ediice of a national history 
to be erected in the distant future. Remarkably, external historical interest in the region 
was compartmentalized in a similar way. The Czech Konstantin Jireček’s Geschichte 
der Bulgaren (1876), which is celebrated as laying the foundation of modern 
Bulgarian historiography, was followed by the no less fundamental Geschichte der 
Serben (1911). The English historian William Miller wrote his Southeast-European 
collection in 1896, tellingly entitled The Balkans: Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia and 
Montenegro (reedited in 1899 and 1908), while publishing a separate volume on the 
History of the Ottoman Empire in the Cambridge World History series. 
Interestingly, the period around the turn of the century, generally characterized by 
the radicalization of national discourses and the emergence of anti-liberal nationalism, 
came to be also inluenced by the emergence of schools of non-national methodology. 
This trend capitalized on the rise of comparativist methodologies, constructing a sort 
of Southeast-European (Balkan) unit of analysis. Although the terms “Balkans” and, 
more rarely, “Southeastern Europe” appeared at the beginning of the century, it seems 
to have been initially used, next to geographers, mainly by scholars interested in 
comparative linguistics and ethnography, especially in common elements discovered 
in the languages and folklore of the region (Drace-Francis 2003: 277).2 
In this respect, the central role of German educational and research institutions 
– with Leipzig (comparative linguistics, folklore and ethnography – Weigand and 
Leskien, Lamprecht, Wundt), Berlin (Archiv für slavische Philologie), and Munich 
(Byzantine studies, Byzantinische Zeitschrift) at the forefront – deserves mention. 
In Leipzig August Leskien (1840-1916)3 held a chair of the department of Slavic 
philology during forty years and was considered, by Bulgarian commentators at least, 
“a teacher of all our outstanding Slavists” (Iordanov 1938: 62). Gustav Weigand 
(1860-1931) acted as a similarly powerful authority – a linguist and a fervent 
champion of the comparative study of Balkan linguistics and ethnography, which he 
2. The terms “Turkey in Europe” or “Balkan peninsula” were also used, alternatively or in parallel, at 
the time.
3. Leskien was an authority in Slavic linguistics and in Old Bulgarian – “altbulgarischen 
(altkirchenslavischen) Sprache” – as the language of the Glagolic and Cyrilic monuments.
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saw as forming one intermingled space through long-term interaction. He founded the 
Institute for Romanian Language (1893), later transformed into the Institute for Balkan 
Languages, which focused mainly on comparative Balkan linguistics and folklore. 
His Ethnographie von Makedonien (Leipzig, 1924), where he searched for the sources 
of the ethnic and linguistic diversity in  Macedonia, has become a blueprint for Balkan 
ethnography and, at the same time, a key reference in the Bulgarian national narrative 
of Macedonia.4 
The upsurge in comparative linguistics was closely linked to some of the earliest 
attempts at identifying what is now known as the Balkan linguistic union (or 
“linguistic area,” Sprachbund) – “the irst area of contact-induced language change to 
be identiied as such” and the model prototype for language contact, interaction and 
convergence (Friedman 2007: 201).5 Indeed, linguists irst used the term “Balkanism” 
to indicate a lexical and, more indicatively, grammatical “feature shared among 
the unrelated or only distantly related languages of the Balkans” – Balkan Slavic, 
Balkan Romance, Albanian Greek and Balkan Turkish dialects, which they attributed 
to either a common substratum or communal multilingualism and contact-induced 
change. Linguistic Balkanization’, i.e. the creation of a relatively uniied linguistic 
area owing to centuries of multilingual contact, is thus the very opposite of political 
‘Balkanization’ as fragmentation (Friedman 2007: 202) conveying exclusively 
negative connotations (M. Todorova). Such similarities among the Balkan languages 
were irst observed by Jernej Kopitar (Kopitar 1829) and Franc Miklošič (Miklosich 
1861),6 and in time came to be increasingly interpreted as testimonies of “centuries of 
multilingualism and interethnic contact at the most intimate levels” (Friedman 1994-
95: 89).7
The establishment of Balkan linguistics as a subdiscipline within linguistics in the 
1920s went hand in hand with basic syntheses and theoretical formulations that still 
inform the ield (Friedman 2006: 659). As late as 1929, the then leading Romanian 
4. These institutes/courses/seminars/chairs together with the Leipzig-based Slavic Academic Society 
(1878-1898) became platforms for intra-regional transfer: in the Institute for Romanian Language, 
Bulgarians studied Romanian language and history; the goal of the Slavic Academic Society” was 
“the rapprochement among the Slav students living in Leipzig for the purpose of exploring the life, 
literature and history of the Slav peoples,” while political and social issues were excluded from the 
discussions.
5. “In modern terms, a sprachbund is understood as two or more geographically contiguous and 
genealogically different languages sharing grammatical and lexical developments that result from 
language contact rather than a common ancestral source” (Friedman 2006: 657).
6. J. Kopitar’s characterization of Balkan Romance, Balkan Slavic, and Albanian as “drey 
lexikalisch verschiedenen, aber grammatisch identischen Sprachen” (‘three lexically distinct but 
grammatically identical languages’) – which he attributed to the influence of a Thraco-Illyrian 
substratum – is taken as the earliest indication of the Balkan sprachbund (Kopitar 1829: 106). 
Miklošič focuses on the relationships of Balkan Slavic and Romance (Miklosich 1861: 6-8).
7. The original formulation of the concept of ‘lingustic area’ is attributed to the Russian linguist 
N.S.Trubetzkoy (1923: 107-24). Trubetzkoy argued that the “theory [of a common linguistic 
substratum] is not suficient to explain the coincidences between languages of different genealogical 
families” (Trubetzkoy 1933), thus stressing the importance of language interaction and contact-
induced change.
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historian Nicolae Iorga would still ind it instructive to draw historians’ attention to 
the positive tradition set by philologists, who, “in this respect [of highlighting the 
common characteristics of Balkan languages], had surpassed the historians,” and to 
recommend to the latter “to operate in the way philologists had long been doing by 
dealing with all Balkan languages.” (Iorga referred speciically to Gustav Weigand 
and the Danish linguist Kristian Sandfeld [1873-1942]) (Iorga 2008 [1929]: 14-15).8
Comparative folkloristics and ethnography developed simultaneously with 
comparative linguistics. A leading practitioner and a champion of what we would 
call today the “history of cultural transfer” at the turn of the 20th century was 
August Leskien’s disciple, the Bulgarian ethnographer and literary scholar Ivan D. 
Shishmanov (1862-1928). Shishmanov considerably expanded on the assumption 
of crisscrossing Balkan (poetic) cultures that was originally developed in Leskien’s 
Fairytales from the Balkan lands (Leskien 1925), and was among the irst to talk about 
les savants balkaniques and of the need for communication among them. In the spirit 
of the critical post-Romantic method he dispelled the notion of the autochthonous 
roots and the uniqueness of “national folklore” (as propagated by what he dubbed 
“patriotic romanticism”), and instead charted a vast global network of exchange 
– ‘internationality’ – of beliefs, tales, epic traditions and popular lore. He came to 
what were then the unconventional conclusions that, 
The existent researches sufice to persuade us that we should stop regarding 
the popular lore of any single people as its totally original creation. There had 
been borrowings since time immemorial. … The originality of a culture often 
lies in nothing other but its more or less self-reliant remaking of the borrowed 
foreign elements. Peoples – small and big – are great plagiarists. (Shishmanov 
1965: 373)
Shishmanov thus undercut the romantic notion of national uniqueness and 
exceptionality that precluded the quest for resemblances in the development of 
nations. For him, all these interactions and mutual borrowings were possibly due 
to the similarities in the development of individual nations. These ‘transfers’ and 
‘entanglements,’ to put it in the present-day transnationalist vocabulary, riveted the 
very fabric of a people’s wisdom and were paralleled by those characterizing what 
Shishmanov deined as the “patriotic period” in the study of the folk. At that time, 
forged claims to national authenticity appeared as “some kind of vital law that 
implacably displays itself at the beginning of each scientiic revival” (Shishmanov 
1966: 7-22).
In some of his most authoritative comparative studies, such as The Song about 
the Dead Brother in the Epic of the Balkan Peoples (Shishmanov 1966: 62-215), 
Shishmanov took on to trace meticulously the itinerary of popular folk themes and their 
local variants, whose diffusion outlined a cultural-historical area. He thus set himself 
“the task of making not only a contribution to comparative folklore, comparative 
8. See also Gustav Weigand (Weigand 1925) and Kristian Sandfeld (Sandfeld 1930). Sandfeld 
attributed almost all the commonalities of the Balkan sprachbund to the influence and prestige 
of Byzantine Greek. Other linguists saw these commonalities as the result of the influence of the 
Thraco-Illyrian substratum (Kopitar), the Balkan Slavic (K. Leake) or Balkan Latin (G. Solta). 
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literary history in particular, but also a small contribution to the demopsychology 
of the Balkan nationalities” (Shishmanov 1966: 147). Of interest to us here are two 
particular outcomes of Shishmanov’s painstaking investigations. 
First, the ‘cultural space’, which his comparative studies charted, was a zone 
deined by interaction and internal migrations of popular themes with considerable 
local variations rooted in speciic historical contexts. The cultural-historical geography 
thus drawn cut across the geographical boundaries of the region, the administrative 
borders of empires and the cultural ones of religion. The genesis of the plot about the 
dead brother was found to be in ancient Asia Minor, from where it had spread to the 
Balkan populations south of the Danube; that folk theme was missing in the lands 
of the Romanian kingdom (Regat) but its Romanian variants could be encountered 
in Bukovina (where, Shishmanov surmised, they had been transferred by Bulgarian 
migrants). At the same time, the reciprocal North-Central European plot about the 
dead iancé (Lenorenstoff, which became extremely popular in the 19th century through 
Gottfried August Bürger‘s poem ‘Lenore’), was found to be nonexistent among the 
Bulgarians, the Greeks, the Arumanians and the Albanians, but could be encountered 
among the Serbo-Croats and in the Romanian kingdom. So, rather than being deined 
by cultural faultlines, the Balkan ethnographic region stood wide open to both the 
East and the West, while its internal geography was carved into variously shaped, 
movable ‘ethnographic sub-areas’ – some overlapping with, others excluding, parts of 
the ‘geographic’, ‘linguistic’ or ‘historical’ Balkans.  
Secondly, notwithstanding the intensity of exchange and the similarities within this 
historical zone, Shishmanov stopped short of devising a notion of a ‘Balkan culture’ 
or ‘Balkan demopsychology’ deined by particular features, if not stable boundaries. 
Setting off from the assumption about the immanent and global interconnections 
between cultures, Shishmanov does not appear to have been keen in distinguishing 
between intra-Balkan and inter-Balkan “borrowings.” To his ethnographic perspective, 
however, it was obvious that interconnection and exchanges were especially intense 
and traceable between neighbouring countries of similar development levels. 
Shishmanov’s implicit understanding of the region thus appears to have been one 
about a luctuating space of cultural osmosis based on long-standing co-existence, 
interaction and percolation. Signiicantly, the agencies and the driving forces behind 
this (regional or global) process were the national cultures. 
Folklore, Shishmanov tells us, is the “people’s science,” the “science of the poor 
in spirit” which allows us to “probe deeply into the soul of the folk, to get to know its 
outlooks and the ideas driving it, the notions it had generated or inherited or borrowed, 
and the ways in which all these had been transformed in its consciousness: how they 
had changed, which particular form they had taken in contrast to the notions of other 
peoples, etc.” (Shishmanov, 1966: 23). Ultimately, the important question appeared to 
be “what inluence all those numerous races, which had been in contact with us in the 
course of history, had exerted on our national type, on our culture, our customs, our 
language. That means to examine all foreign components of our nationality, culture, 
he Balkans as an Idée-Force
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language, etc.” (Shishmanov, 1966: 268). Indeed it befell ethnography9 to perform 
what he saw as “a cardinal political task,” for “folklore studies are the sole instrument 
for deining the ethnographic boundaries of the various Balkan peoples” (Shishmanov 
1966: 30-31).10 
Thus, while conceding that national isolation did not exist and that each culture 
evolved in a process of continuous exchange with other cultures, Shishmanov’s 
‘comparativism’ pursued above all the identiication of the “foreign elements” and 
“borrowings” in the national makeup. The organizing agency and the key reference 
remained the nation. Shishmanov never identiied that which ultimately deined a 
nation’s individuality (and its “ethnographic boundaries”) so that it could participate 
in an exchange with other nations, the ‘core’ that lay beneath all the “foreign” impacts 
and proved able to assimilate them while remaining the ‘same’ national individuality. 
But it was clear that such an ethnocultural hub did exist, it represented the actual 
agency of history, and its thorough exploration was the scholar’s chief duty – “in order 
to understand the direction in which the nation had evolved and to chart the direction 
of its future development in the best possible sense” (Shishmanov 1966: 23). 
This ‘double-scaled’ ethnographic vision was not without match elsewhere in the 
region. Drawing on his investigations of medieval history and literature, the Romanian 
philologist and historian Ioan Bogdan (1864-1919) made a name for himself by 
insisting on and seeking to demonstrate the signiicance of the Slavic studies for the 
Romanians. He agreed with Shishmanov in arguing that the Romanians, much like 
the Bulgarians, could not gain a proper understanding of their national history unless 
they perceived of their culture in its connectedness with other national cultures in the 
region. At the same time, again in full accord with Shishmanov, he saw the duty of 
cultural history to undertake a solid examination of the nation from an ethnographic 
and statistical point of view in order “to account for the constitutive elements of our 
nationality and to understand its nature and inclinations” (Bogdan 1905: 20). In both 
these cases one can clearly detect the close connection between comparativism and 
the national framework of analysis. 
Yet awareness of, and research into, the Balkan linguistic community and folklore/
ethnography were the irst, and for quite some time the only, areas in which the idea of 
a Balkan historical commonality thrived. The notion of a Southeastern Europe, as far 
as it surfaced in academic discourse, stood for a cultural koiné rather than a historical 
region. It was in the heat of and mainly after the large-scale transformations wrought 
by the two Balkan wars and World War I that other disciplines and other visions of 
the nature of the regional commonality will play in the debate and reformulate the 
concept of Southeastern Europe. 
9. As a “systematic enquiry” of folklore, ethnography, according to Shishmanov, involved “literary 
history, on the one hand, and ethnology and popular psychology, on the other, that is the natural and 
the cultural history of a people” (Shishmanov 1966: 23-24).
10. Corroborating the Bulgarian nationality of the Macedonians was a key target of this research 
program.
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Anthropogeographic and ethnopsychological structure of the Balkan 
Peninsular
The pre-eminence of linguistic and folklore comparatism at the establishment of 
Balkan studies had some immediate and some long-term consequences. Among the 
most durable was the association of “Balkanology” primarily, sometimes solely, with 
ethnology and linguistics – a narrow reading that has survived until today.11 In its 
own time, this disciplinary approach impacted regionalist research in two opposite 
directions. On the one hand, the commonalities in grammar, syntax, belief, and 
popular lore seemed to imply an underlying primeval unity in the way of thinking, 
mentality and the unconscious. This trend evolved simultaneously with the upsurge of 
psychological discourses irst in Germany and then in France. But since the latter were 
dominated by the disciplines of Völkerpsychologie (or comparative folk psychology) 
and national characteristics, the result usually was to underwrite rather than subvert 
and relativize national fragmentation.12
For Shishmanov, as we could see, comparative folklore was a key to grasping the 
“demopsychology of the Balkan nationalities,” not some common “Balkan mentality.” 
But the prominent place in conceptualizing the Balkans as an area of ininite diversity 
and continuous interaction undoubtedly belongs to Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927) – “the 
founder of Balkan geology, geography and anthropogeography” – indeed of, as the 
next generation of regional scholars would argue, “Balkanistics” proper.13
Signiicantly, Cvijić spoke of the Balkan Peninsula – a term he deinitely preferred 
to “the Balkans” and never used interchangeably with Southeastern Europe. Moreover, 
while his geomorphological observations encompassed the whole Peninsula, his 
psychological investigations concerned only the South Slavs. The Romanians, Turks, 
11. See, for example, the definition on http://wapedia.mobi/de/Balkanologie, and that of the 
Zeitschrift für Balkanologie: Die Balkanologie ist eine Teilwissenschaft von Ethnologie und 
Linguistik, “deren Ziel es ist, die Kulturen auf der Balkanhalbinsel in ihren sprachlichen und 
außersprachlichen Manifestationen ethnien- und sprachfamilienübergreifend, vergleichend und 
interdisziplinär-integrativ zu untersuchen” (http://www.zeitschrift-fuer-balkanologie.de/index2.
htm; http://www2.uni-jena.de/philosophie/slawistik/ztsrbalk.htm ), last accessed on 20th December 
2010.
12. We should also note that the need for clearer ethnocultural definition at the turn of the 20th 
century was intimately linked with the rise of ethnopsychology which was spurred not only by 
advancements in social psychology but also by historians like Lamprecht, Ranke and Burckhardt. 
This in turn presupposed an effort at characterological definition on a comparative scale. It is 
not surprising at this background that preoccupation with ethnopsychology and its comparativist 
methodology came to unite the three otherwise rather divergent “Balkanists” of the late 19th and 
early 20th century – Shishmanov, Cvijić and Iorga.
13. The results of Cvijić’s immense work on the human geography of the Balkans and his conceptions 
in this domain were summarized in his famous La Péninsule Balkanique. Géographie humaine, 
first published in French (1918) and translated in Serbian in two volumes as The Balkan Peninsula 
and the South-Slav Lands. Basics of Anthropogeography. I (1922), II (1931). La Péninsule 
Balkanique is celebrated by the “geographical craft” as “one of the great regional geographies of 
its time” (Freeman 1967: 192). Cvijić’s research has had a profound impact on geographical and 
ethnographical thought and practice, in and beyond the Balkans.
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Greeks, Albanians and Vlachs were not part of Cvijić’s ethnopsychological map of 
the Balkans. 
One of the most striking features of Cvijić’s anthropogeographic map of the 
Balkan Peninsula is its rigorously taxonomic character. It revolved around numerous 
classiications concerning geographic regions, geomorphological and physical 
features, civilizational (or cultural) zones, types of settlement, and psychic types. This 
intimated a vision of great structural and cultural diversity over time and space effected 
by causes of various order – geographical, historical (political), social, ethnic.14 
Cvijić divided the Balkans into four cultural zones: modiied Byzantine (Old 
Balkan) civilization “Balkanism in the true sense of the word;” zone of the Turkish 
and Eastern (“Turco-Oriental”) inluences; zone of the Western and Central European 
culture; and patriarchal cultural zone. Noteworthy is Cvijić’s assertion, that “The 
most pronounced boundary in this region is not the boundary between Byzantine and 
Western civilization [as it was usually thought] but that between the patriarchal regime 
and the Byzantine civilization” (Cvijić 1918: 481; Cvijić 1922: 87-88). Moreover, 
Cvijić saw the historical development of the Balkan peoples as being marked by 
discontinuities and assimilations between different clusters of cultures. “The lack of 
continuity of the civilizational inluences is a characteristic of the Balkan Peninsula, a 
condition the reverse of that which obtained in Western and Central Europe” (Cvijić 
1922: 471). In the end, what one is confronted with is a palimpsest of considerably 
modiied, partly overlapping and largely circumscribed civilizational zones. 
Virtually coinciding with these zones of civilization were Cvijić’s psychological 
types: Dinaric, Central, Eastern Balkan (Bulgarian) and Pannonian. While I cannot 
elaborate here on the characteristics attributed to these four psychic types or on 
the foregrounded primacy with which Cvijić endowed the Dinaric type, one aspect 
deserves mention.15 The notion of a “Balkan mentality,” both as a generalized regional 
and as an ethnic category, has long been duly criticized. Its local diffusion has been 
attributed to dubious academic popularity external to the region penchant for portraying 
the Balkan cultures as a sanctuary of patriarchal practices and life-styles long-extinct 
elsewhere in Europe. As a matter of fact, however, Cvijić was the irst to implement 
this “scientiic” approach to the Balkans. Scholars of note like Gerhard Gesemann, 
perhaps the most powerful voice among the interwar German “folk psychologists” of 
the Balkan Slavs, might have gone a step further in supplying Cvijić’s psychological 
and folkloric interpretations with racial underpinnings. But neither the discipline of 
Balkan folk psychology nor the genre of “heroic lifestyle” as an epitome of the true 
Balkanness and of homo balkanicus were his inventions. Indeed, Cvijić’s scholarly 
reputation itself appears to have lent respectability both to the “regional relevance” 
of the discipline and to the conclusions of as different and (in their own way and 
14. Although stressing the preeminence of geography, Cvijić was not a naive geographical determinist. 
He argued that, “Next to the geographic, three groups of historical and social factors have strongly 
impacted the ethnographic and anthropogeographic phenomena in the Balkan Peninsula. These 
are the historical events, the zones of civilization and the migrations of peoples and ethnic groups” 
(Cvijić 1922: 69; italics in the original).
15. On the debate between Cvijić and the Croatian anthropologist Dinko Tomašić regarding the 
Dinaric-Pannonian, resp. “highlander-lowlander” opposition, see Živković 1997 and Kaser 2003. 
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scholarly tradition) salient regionalists as Gesemann and Fernand Braudel, both 
of whom drew heavily on Cvijić’s ethnopsychological typology (Gesemann 1943; 
Braudel 1995: 776-780).
Finally, against the doctrine of racial purity, Cvijić maintained that racial 
intermixture had occurred everywhere in the peninsula, and in certain areas at least 
nationality was variable and uncertain. But this somehow did not subvert what he 
typically saw as the divergent, irreconcilable and often antagonistic ethnic identities 
(the Yugoslavs being a partial exception to this rule). On the contrary, the ontological 
fragmentation ultimately sealed the impossibility of a Balkan cultural convergence 
and unity and, by extension, of a unitary concept of the Balkans – not only in Cvijić’s 
present, but also in the Balkan past.
All in all, Cvijić’s conceptualization of the Balkans may be seen as foundational 
for the later-day visions in at least two directions. Firstly, he brought to the fore and 
scientiically underpinned the inherent multidimensional diversity of the region, which 
thus became constitutive of the region’s speciics. Cvijić reformulated what had been 
typically seen as an “ethnographic museum,” into a complex structure of geographic, 
historical, cultural, social and economic intraregional variations whose combination, 
somewhat paradoxically, turned into “unifying structural characteristics” of the region. 
It should be noted that this vision of the region will thenceforth evolve in parallel to the 
unitary one. “Up to our day,” Joseph S. Roucek maintained in 1939, “the Balkans have 
remained a striking example of disunity – geographic, ethnical, linguistic, religious, 
cultural and political” (Roucek 1939: 1). In his History of Southeastern Europe (1950) 
Georg Stadtmüller warned: “We should nonetheless be wary of the dangerous and 
misleading notion, that it [the term Southeastern Europe-DM] implies a peculiar 
unity of the space thus denoted. The space of Southeastern Europe is rather marked 
by internal diversity and differentiation as no other part of Europe is” (Stadtmüller 
1950: 14). The problem had been already raised by Fritz Valjavec in the 1930s when 
registering the lack of “at least to some extent unitary research area and unitary 
concept of Southeastern Europe” (Valjavec 1941: 11). Valjavec himself, however, left 
the question open: for him Southeast-European studies were a methodical “complexio 
oppositorum” (bringing together a wide range of simultaneously applied disciplinary 
methods), where Southeastern Europe serves above all as a “working concept” 
(Arbeitsbegriff), but where the “unity of Southeastern Europe” is not a working pre-
requisite for the studies of the South-East (Valjavec 1942: 5). 
Cvijić’s notion of the Balkans is foundational also on account of elaborating the 
connection between nature and culture – a connection that, again, will be played out 
in different registers, especially during the interwar period. His major contribution to 
the inquiry of the region, from an anthropological point of view, is that he was the irst 
to deine a historical geography of the Balkan man. From the point of view of history, 
it was the realization and the demonstration that written sources were not the sole, and 
in his case not even the primary, building material of the historical narrative about 
the region. But he did not construct, on this basis, a regional cultural or historical 
speciicity, a discrete civilizational ‘Balkan type.’ On the contrary: his empirical 
studies framed an area which, albeit characterized by considerable demographic 
interconnections and cultural overlapping, did not evolve and stabilize into a more 
or less unitary cultural-historical space. Nowhere did Cvijić try to deine any uniform 
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characteristic features or attributes of the region as a whole. His interest seems above 
all to have been, not identifying an overarching commonality, but highlighting the 
internal diversity, complexity and heterogeneity of the region.16
Was anything holding the region together, that could deine it as an analytical 
whole? Cvijić did not directly confront this question yet his writings intimated a few 
answers. 
At a certain level, Cvijić’s “regional scale” of observation itself seems to have 
sketched the region as a unit deined by the scope of interaction. Cvijić himself 
designated it as the “Balkan peninsula” even if, for reasons of his own, he included in 
it large parts of the Pannonian plane and excluded the Romanians. 
More substantially, one can detect in his research certain directions – and an 
underlying argument – that prioritized some tendencies over others. He distinguished 
what is recurrent, typical or showing the potential to become a dominant regional 
“type” amidst the huge variety of trends, local conditions and idiosyncrasies.
Mobility or migrations – or what Cvijić called metanastasic movements – 
in particular stand out as a powerful vehicle of intra-regional “penetration and 
connection,” continuously and effectively subverting the centrifugal tendencies. 
They allowed the expansion of certain civilizational zones, respectively (ethno-)
psychological types, over bigger parts of the peninsula thus overpowering the weight 
and the effects of cultural fragmentation. Metanastasic movements, and the zones 
they came to form, are what ultimately deined the prevailing civilizational and ethno-
demographic proile of the region. Over the long run they tended to create, not a 
relatively homogeneous regional historical and cultural space (as Iorga would have it), 
but smaller or bigger homogeneous ethnic, psychic and civilizational enclaves which, 
with regards to their relative strength and scale, were hierarchically ordered. Hardly 
surprisingly, the Serbs stood out as the most populous and dynamic force behind these 
movements – the vibrant Balkan metanastasic population par excellence.17 Around 
this Serbian (later Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian) core the region’s internal “centre” was 
supposed to emerge with the potential to neutralize, even reverse, the centrifugal 
tendencies resulting from its diversity. Cvijić, as a matter of fact, came up with a 
geopolitical theory, drawing on the conjunction of geomorphologic and geophysical 
analysis with human geography and migrations. This theory gave a central political 
and strategic role to “Greater Serbia” as ordained by geography and being in the 
interest of the West. History thus became subordinated to a geopolitical and ethno-
cultural framework. Eventually the regional narrative is not anti-national, on the 
contrary, it was meant to buttress Yugoslav nation-building, where the common racial 
characteristics overwrite the diverging historical, religious and social experiences. 
16. Some critics went as far as to blame Cvijić that he had deliberately stressed the geomorphological 
and geophysical diversity of the Balkans in order to create geographical justification for the 
existing national states and undermine the idea of a Balkan unification (Ćorović 1937: 9-11).
17. “The above survey indicates that metanastasic movements were of different kind and more 
intensive among the South Slavs of the western and central regions than among the Bulgarians. 
Among the former the Serbs had embarked on much more significant metanastasic movements 
than the Croats and the Slovenes” (Cvijić 1922: 111-112).
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As an area of continuous interaction between distinct and tangible ‘ethnicities’ 
and ‘types’, Cvijić’s notion of the Balkans resonates in a sense with Shishmanov’s. 
At the same time, his understanding of the features that came to characterize the 
Balkan Peninsula is in many ways at variance with Iorga’s. This is noteworthy on 
two counts. First, both of them were usually revered as the quintessential founders of 
“Balkanology” in the same breath; second, the historical framework and the cultural 
phenomena they referred to in their interpretations were almost identical, but their 
conclusions were rather different.
Byzance après Byzance: the cultural-historical entity of Southeastern 
Europe 
The incorporation of a national history in a universal history, thence the search 
for a larger, integrative cultural or civilizational space, had igured high on the 
historiographic agenda ever since the institutionalization of history in the Balkan 
states. For most of the 19th century, that space was the Western world. From around the 
beginning of the 20th century, alternative spaces, such as those deined by genealogical 
afinity (e.g. the Slavic world) or with which the nation happened to be in direct 
and permanent interrelations, began to be more systematically promoted as possible 
mediators for  broader integration.
This trend and the call for non-national historical methodology radiating from 
Leipzig – especially from Karl Lamprecht – converged in the work of Nicolae Iorga 
(1871-1940), the most prominent Romanian historian of the irst four decades of 
the 20th century. Iorga went much further than Shishmanov and Cvijić ever did in 
envisioning a sort of Balkan commonality, historicity, phenomenology and culture. 
This harmonized with his predilection for the new cultural history which, as he wrote, 
“concerns above all what is deep, fundamental and general in human life.” Iorga was 
most inclined to build his synthesis on the basis of collective psychology and a belief 
in culture as a binding force and a principal instrument of any ecumenicity. His vision 
of the area’s speciicity and mission relected a distinctive relationship of national, 
regional and global scales of historical experience. 
Already in 1914, in his inaugurating speech for the Institute for Southeast-European 
Studies in Bucharest, which he had founded the year before, Iorga made a plea for the 
study of the “history of great territorial units, … of the great currents of civilization 
and the spiritual condition which these units create, of the durable social forms which 
they succeed to crystallize” (Iorga 1914: 42).18 By that time he had already published 
his irst synthetic works as advocated (in fact inspired) by Lamprecht: Geschichte des 
Rumänischen Volkes (2 Vols., 1905) and, heralding his regional syntheses, Geschichte 
des Osmanischen Reiches nach den Quellen dargestellt (5 vols., 1908-13), in which 
he exposed the emotional nature of conceiving of the Turks and their empire as an 
historical anomaly detrimental to civilization, and proposed the study of Ottoman 
history as an integral part of world history.
18. Iorga himself made no secret of the political underpinnings of the Institute: the establishment 
of such an institute in Bucharest was a legitimate “affirmation of Romania’s rights” as a major 
regional player (Iorga 1911: 20).
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Iorga was by no doubt the irst regional historian to grasp the signiicance of a 
common heritage. The scope, and underlying contents, of his notion of “Southeastern 
Europe,” in outspoken opposition to the Balkans and the Balkan Peninsula, deserves 
special attention.  Indeed, we may speak of a radical re-coniguration following 
Iorga’s observation that “peoples are not in the least deined by the region on which 
they lean or by the region in which they are placed but by the region towards which 
they look” (Iorga 1935: 108). By this criterion of orientation, ordained by geography 
and history, the Rumanians were a “Carpathian people,” a “Danubian people” and a 
“people of the right bank of the Danube,”  the Greeks were a “Mediterranean people,” 
the Turks a Central Asian one, and the Yugo-Slavs belonged to different regions; the 
Bulgarians were the only impeccably “Balkan people” but they too sought to break 
free from their land-locked position by reaching out to the Black Sea and the Adriatic. 
The geographical term Balkans, therefore, was “inaccurate [and] unjustiied; there 
exists no element on which it can lean” (Iorga 1935: 107-110; Iorga 1940: 6-8). Iorga 
never explained in what way the alternative term of Southeastern Europe was better 
suited to integrate these various orientations. But it certainly fulilled another salient 
desideratum: unlike the Balkans, the region of Southeastern Europe, in Iorga’s reading, 
could capture the integral space of “Eastern Romanity”: the “Carpatho-Balkanic” or 
“Carpatho-Danubian” realm incorporating the Romanians with the once Romanized 
inhabitants (the Vlachs) to the south of the Danube, i.e. in “the Balkans” proper (Iorga 
1999: 122-125, 135-137). This was the semantics underlying, what he called, “our 
people’s balkanism.”
Its outgrowth was the notion of Byzance après Byzance (1935) which brilliantly 
exempliies the synthesis of universal and national history through the mediation 
of regional history. On the one hand, it postulated the belonging of the Southeast-
European peoples to a universal civilization bridging the East and the West yet being 
neither of the two, possessing a unique ecumenical role and a unique contribution 
to world history. On the other hand, it stressed the idea of Byzantium’s spiritual and 
institutional continuity through the Romanians once the empire had ceased to exist 
politically – an idea also expressed in his History of the Balkan States in the Modern 
Age (1913). “There was a time,” Iorga contended in the introduction to his latter book,
when it appeared that the entire Byzantine, Balkan legacy should be inherited 
by our [Romanian] princes who (…) showed that they wanted to preserve 
it and that they were capable of sacriicing themselves for it. (…) For ive 
hundred years we had given asylum to the whole higher religious life, to the 
whole cultural life of the peoples from across the Danube. The Greek Byzantium 
and the Slav Byzantium, which derived from it, had thus lived for another half 
millennium among us and through us, if not for us…(Iorga 1913: 8, 11) 
It was the wreaking of a place for the Romanité orientale in the world history – an 
effort crowned by his monumental La place des Roumains dans l’histoire universelle 
(3 Vols., 1935-36) – that led Iorga to elaborate on the historical continuity and cohesion 
of Southeastern Europe.
 Instead of civilizational discontinuities and ethnic fragmentation, as Cvijić was 
intimating, the region came to be distinguished by a “synthesis of a completely 
particular character common to the whole South-East of Europe,” which furnished the 
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“base of its common elements” (Iorga 1935: 110). The primary, “prehistoric” element 
of this synthesis, and one “which distinguishes the East from the European South-
East,” were the Thracians, who were “at the origin of everything in the European 
South-East” (Iorga 1935: 115; Iorga 2008: passim). “We can say that even today, 
in Southeastern Europe, there are millions of crypto-Thracians, people who speak 
different languages, believed to belong to completely distinct nations, that is to say, 
which have their history, their ethnographic if not ethnological character, and [who] 
nevertheless belong at the same time to that great race, whose history unfortunately 
had not [yet] been written but by philologists” (Iorga 1935: 115).
The second element of the synthesis was the Roman layer. The regional network of 
cities, fortresses, routes and markets – and the interdependence which they sustained 
– “are not, still at present, but the continuation of the old establishments, in which 
the Thracian element was transformed under Roman inluence” (Iorga 1935: 120-
121). That Roman “order” was continued by a “neo-Roman” one – Byzantium. With 
one important difference: while the Romans effectively governed, the Byzantines 
“had left to the populations the right each to live in its own country, according to 
its habits.”19 The Ottoman Turks carried on the latter tradition: “the conquerors … 
became the continuators of the Byzantine empire, with the same mixture of centralism 
and local freedom for all the peoples in this region” (Iorga 1935: 123). If that “formă 
de universalitate” which Byzantium presented20 could survive until the nineteenth 
century, Iorga contended, it was due to the Ottomans  – “not […] the destructors of 
the Byzantine empire, but its continuers.” Peace, local autonomy and opportunities for 
the small nations, which these two empires had ensured, made possible the endurance 
of that “unity in diversity” which came to distinguish the region (Iorga 2000: 71-88; 
Iorga 1940: 14).
Consequent to this genealogy of the region’s unity, Iorga sought to dispel the idea 
of the “Oriental Southeastern Europe” as being either markedly Oriental, or indeed 
worthy of scorn for being as Oriental as it was. In his own time he discovered many 
more vestiges of the prehistoric and classical legacies, e.g., art, dress, rituals and 
customs, than of the Orient. The “deep realities below the upper social layers” and 
the “popular life” across the whole region “were very little affected by the oriental 
inluence.” Eastern Orthodoxy itself was “much more a religion of pagan European 
superstitions and rationalist Greek interpretations than of myths coming from Asia… 
The orthodox religion, I say, does not possess the entire oriental mystique: within 
it there exist elements with origin in a much deeper local past” (Iorga 1935: 117). 
Populations coming from the Asian steppes had been completely assimilated by the 
indigenous peoples. As for the Ottoman Turks, not only had they borrowed heavily 
from the Roman/Byzantine institutions, but in racial terms they “had always been 
19. “Byzance n’est point autre chose que la souveraineté romaine de jadis… ; tant qu’a duré l’Empire 
byzantin, dont l’utilité a été immense, cet ordre romain est resté immuable, les éléments 
d’adaptation, d’emprunt, aux différentes époques ultérieures, s’y ajoutant seulement” (Iorga 1935: 
121-22).
20. Defined “as a complex of institutions, a political system, a religious formation, a type of civilization, 
comprising the  Hellenic intellectual legacy, Roman law, the Orthodox religion, and everything it 
created and preserved in terms of art” (Iorga 2000: 25).
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a minority in Southeastern Europe,” their racial make-up  having been thoroughly 
altered by the massive ‘infusion’ of local blood (Iorga 1935: 117-118).21
Iorga’s Southeastern Europe thus differs considerably, and not only geographically, 
from the Balkans of Shishmanov and Cvijić. For the irst time, the existence of a 
“fundamental unity resting on archaic traditions” is postulated. A “particular 
[culture] common to the whole European South-East,” a shared racial nexus, and a 
peculiar historical, ethnographic and cultural “synthesis” between all those peoples 
is formulated: “The whole European South-East forms, in a certain sense, the same 
country, is the same territory, with the same memories – an integral world… […] 
Everything connects us beyond our will” (Iorga 1940: 12, 14). Rather than presenting 
the sum total of ethnic essences marked by external borrowings (Shishmanov) or 
migrations (Cvijić) – in other words, rather than being ‘nationalized’ – the Balkan 
nations came to be ‘Balkanized’ by way of being endowed with a common heritage 
distinguished by speciic historical evolution, life forms and culture. This speciicity, 
drawing upon the great Thraco-Illyrian-Roman tradition and epitomized by Byzantium, 
was taken over by the Ottoman Empire and constituted the heritage that the Balkan 
peoples shared. All of them – Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Romanians, Albanians, and 
Turks – had been subject to the same great Western, Eastern, racial, and religious 
inluences. Where Cvijić saw discontinuity between the Roman, Byzantine, and 
Ottoman ‘layers’ of history, Iorga saw “in essence the same thing: the same peace, 
the same liberties with respect to the small groups, the same routes created for great 
commerce” (Iorga 1940: 11). Precisely where ethnographers and anthropogeographers 
tended to identify a great diversity of local variants and discrete factors, Iorga saw 
cross-regional kinship and permeability to the point of indistinctiveness: in the 
outlook of the village, in houses (except the Mediterranean one) and their internal 
arrangement, in essential elements of vestment, in racial fundament, in popular poetry, 
dances and superstitions, in customs and mores, in way of thinking and sentimentality, 
and – most strikingly – in institutions (royal, administrative, judicial, iscal, military, 
social) (Iorga 2008: 7-14, passim). Interactions between the Balkan peoples were 
crucial for Iorga too, but not in the sense of contacts between distinct albeit closely 
connected groups, but as virtual acts of “coming home” whenever and wherever in 
the region they took place.22 Remarkably, Iorga sought to dispel the Slavic world as a 
‘rival’ symbolic historical region: a Serb, he argued, had much more in common with 
an Albanian or a Romanian, than with a Czech.
It would nevertheless be misleading to presume that Iorga’s interlocking projections 
were only scholarly variations on a political tune. They were no doubt political: the 
institutionalization of Southeast-European studies in Bucharest and the regional 
re-positioning of the Romanian past were meant to underwrite Romania’s growing 
21. “Il n’y a pas de people cohabitant, avec une caractère de culture propre, qui n’ait transformé des 
Turcs” (Iorga 1935 : 122).
22. For example, the Bulgarian clergy and the fighters for a Bulgarian state, who had found asylum 
among the Romanians  north of the Danube, “had the right to come here, where, due to the old-time 
fundamental unity resting on archaic traditions, they were at home,” as were the Phanariots who 
had not come to Romania as Greeks but wanted to become Romanians (Iorga 1940: 12, 13-14).
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political weight in the area after the Balkan wars (1912-13).23 But both conceptually 
and as historical schemata, they were more complex and elaborate than those of the 
bulk of nation-building historians at the time. 
Aligning himself, in the vein of Lamprecht’s global vision of historical 
phenomenology, with the new cultural history, Iorga upheld an emphatically organic 
conception of the historical evolution of humankind. In the perspective of the latter, 
the understanding of the history of an individual nation could not be achieved by 
studying it independently. The peoples, being “necessary, permanent and, in a certain 
sense, eternal creations,” encroached on, transferred to, borrowed from, conquered 
and were subdued by each other. Resonating Shishmanov’s views, Iorga asserted 
that this process of continuous interaction had totally changed the understanding of 
the notion of people. It was not the pure and self-contained entity of the Romantic 
period anymore, but a natural whole with its own organic life, similar to the life of 
individuals: it grew by what it gained from outside, it got cleansed and rejuvenated 
by what it gave up after a certain time, it died and was resurrected. What ultimately 
deined a people’s power and value in the world was “that inherent, elemental energy, 
which determines its potential to assimilate and to radiate, and the proportion in which 
it abandons its worn-out elements” (Iorga 1911: 14-15). 
A striking consequence of this approach was the “disappearance of the distinction 
between world history and national history,” since
The life of a people is continuously enmeshed with the lives of other peoples, 
depending on and continuously inluencing them. Each nation is an energy 
with its own sources and particular circumstances, its special character and 
mission. But none of these energies can be absolutely isolated for study and 
must not be isolated in this way. All these intersecting streams function in the 
same atmosphere and low on the same earth […]. The history of a people, thus, 
touches the history of others, not through leeting mentions or short chapters 
about reciprocal inluences, but is established and preserved in the natural 
medium of human universality, to which it belongs in its highest essence. And 
universal history, in turn, is not anymore (just) a collection of national histories, 
clustered by geographic or cultural criteria, but the study of those connections 
of cultures, political ideas, expansions and conquests on all terrains, transfers, 
transformations, reinforcements and enfeeblements, which should alone be its 
domain – one that is suficiently ‘scientiic’ and ‘philosophic’ as to leave no 
space for any other science or philosophy of history. (Iorga 1911: 17) 
As a Lamprechtianist and participant in Lamprecht’s project of Weltgeschichte, 
Iorga was thus most concerned with situating Romanian history into universal history. 
In this spectacular scheme, the region was assigned a key role as it came to stand as a 
mediating zone and a condition for global integration. 
Special mention in this direction is due to his ethno-populist narrative of the 
Balkan peasantry and the “spiritual life of the village” as the ultimate repository of a 
nation’s distinctive culture – of its “ideas.” The latter was one of the three “historical 
permanencies” – the other two being “soil” and “race” – which, in contrast to the 
23. On the way Iorga’s system of political values had construed his historical knowledge through 
strictly scientific researches, see Pearton (1988) and Pippidi (1991).
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constant lux of events, traversed time and space and determined “all ‘pragmatic’ 
history” (Iorga 1999: 271-282). Permanencies, once again, manifested themselves on 
two levels: in Iorga’s phenomenological perspective they underlay the unity and the 
continuity of a Southeast-European “form of civilization,” but in their speciic blends 
transformed into the mainstay of national authenticity.
In many ways, Iorga’s regionalist projections were groundbreaking. They came 
closest to deining the region in terms of legacy of a common past, hence of shared 
structures and attitudes. For this reason, imperial frameworks were essential in his 
regional vision. But the latter also fused a series of contradictory dimensions as regards 
the connection between the national, the regional, and the universal, scholarship and 
politics, evolutionary and presentist perspectives, methodological subjectivity and 
positivism, ‘nostalgia for totality’ and obsession with Romanianism. At a certain 
juncture in his historiology, the polymorphism of the Southeast-European region 
succumbed to a deeper common factor – the popular rural institutions (Iorga 2008), 
while geography (“soil”) ever imposed itself. However, the structural and explanatory 
conceptual tool for him was neither ‘law’ nor ‘structure’ but supra-institutional culture 
– the persistence of collective ideas, ways of thinking and instinctive behavior that 
furnished the continuity and the organic unity of history across space and time.
We should be aware moreover that both Cvijić’s and Iorga’s positions need to 
be seen in their historical dynamics as they shifted considerably over time. Cvijić’s 
position evolved from narrowly pro-Serbian at the beginning of the 20th century 
to patently pro-South Slav (and anti-Bulgarian) during the First World War, and 
especially around the Paris Peace Conference, to once again “pro-Dinaric” and “anti-
Pannonian” in the 1920s. Iorga’s position also evolved from more squarely nationalist 
in the 1910s to more ‘internationalist’ and ‘Southeast-European’ in the 1930s. But, 
generally speaking, his chronological evolution was less neat, often mixing in parallel 
or even in the same text different registers and paradigms. All in all, the co-existence of 
scholarly and para-scholarly registers was characteristic of interwar Balkanists – from 
Cvijić, Gesemann and Iorga to the relatively most sophisticate school of Balkanology 
in the 1930s.
Balkan organism and homo balcanicus: the interwar “Balkan science”
The 1930s and the irst half of the 1940s saw the crystallization of a more rigorous 
and systematic research program for the region of Southeastern Europe even if, on the 
whole, the national framework retained its powerful position. The initial attempt at 
deining the new “science of Balkanology,” as it was called, belongs to the two editors 
of the Belgrade-based Revue Internationale des Etudes Balkaniques – the Croat Petar 
Skok (1881-1956) and the Serb Milan Budimir (1891-1975), both of them philologists 
and classicists.24 It was aimed at elucidating regional commonalities while “drawing 
upon the comparative method of the nineteenth century,” and pointing national 
24. Not surprisingly, this “pan-regional” agenda, and a number of institutional venues supporting 
it, had an immediate political incentive: they emerged simultaneously with or briefly after the 
conclusion of the Balkan pact in 1934.
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academic research “towards the study of a Balkan organism that had constituted one 
entity since the most distance times” (Budimir & Skok 1934: 2-3). 
Two historical tendencies – uniication and particularism – are said to have 
crystalized into “a unique law of the Balkans [loi balkanique] guiding the vicissitudes 
of the total of their history.” Since Antiquity, these two tendencies have alternated and 
deined the peculiar evolution of this region. The major forces of “Balkan aggregation” 
were the Macedonian dynasty, the Romans, the Byzantine Empire, and the Ottoman 
Empire. Signiicantly, the role of the “Turks” in imposing social and cultural cohesion 
on the whole region was seen to be the most salient. Echoing nineteenth-century 
romanticism, modern science very often misinterpreted the results of the aggregation 
which they achieved, and refused to see what was beneicial in a regime which had 
never implemented a denationalizing policy characteristic for many European states. 
The spheres where the two Balkanologists found the unifying impact of the 
Ottomans to have been most consequential for the future “regional aggregation” 
are worth noting. First, by imposing the same political and social conditions, the 
Turks had effectively amalgamated the mentality of the Balkan peoples. At the same 
time, the mixture of Balkan races had to some extent effaced the mental differences 
which the previous particularist medieval states had induced. Another unifying 
factor was the introduction of “Oriental urbanism” – the Balkan city created by the 
Turks which was “totally different from the ancient and the European.” Remarkably, 
even folklore, and popular literature generally, were found to be the product of the 
“Turkish uniication:” “Among all those peoples, the period of Turkish domination 
had stimulated the blossoming of national epopees [which are] major sources of pride 
for these peoples.” Popular poetry, furthermore, travelled freely across the Turkish 
realm creating common themes and vocabularies. It was to the Turkish regime, again, 
that the Romantic literary movement, the “Balkan Romanticism,” owed its special 
complexion, so different from those of European romanticisms. Finally, it was utterly 
erroneous to consider the Turks hostile to the civilization created in the Balkans before 
them since their empire had maintained a number of Byzantine institutions (Budimir 
& Skok 1934: 5-6, 12).
Here we can see some of the central arguments of the preexistent Balkan 
scholarship, as developed by Shishmanov and Iorga, being brought to their logical 
completion. Individual Balkan renascences, and quite nearly national “individualities” 
themselves, became conceivable only in the framework of the Ottoman Empire. At 
the same time, the whole Romantic structure of nationhood in its Eurocentric mold 
was turned on its head without however subverting the state-building project as such. 
Skok’s and Budimir’s programmatic statement presents the irst attempt of 
formulating the methodology of a “new science” intended “to deine and explain 
the parallel facts that make themselves manifest in the different domains of human 
activity in the Balkans.” To this end they suggested a division of labor: the study 
of only what is speciic to a given people should be left to the specialists in the 
national sciences. This did not imply a rift between regional and national scholars 
as it was from the latter that regionalists would extract information from the national 
sciences, their work presenting a “superior interconnectedness” by means of inter-
Balkan comparisons. A series of examples were adduced in support of the contention 
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that a Balkan perspective alone was capable to shed proper light on major historical 
processes which, when being placed in a strictly national framework, remained 
incomprehensible. In sum,
... Balkanology appears as an immanently comparative science. In essence 
it represents a system of inter-Balkan comparison whose main objective is to 
reveal, understand and deine the Balkan reality such as it has manifested itself, 
across time and space, in the various spheres of human activity. To get to know 
what was and is typical of the Balkans, such is the object it envisages for itself. 
(Budimir & Skok 1934: 23-24)
This Balkanology had two facets – theoretical and practical. “As a theoretical 
science [Balkanology] is called to deepen our knowledge about the relations between 
the Balkan peoples and throw light on the intrinsic laws which had governed and 
continue to govern their development and their life.” As a practical science, it was 
of moral importance. It was “entitled to inluence the Balkan mentality” by giving 
the Balkan statesmen the opportunity to know the Balkan man, his natural and social 
environment, way of thinking and feeling, and, at the same time, by teaching the 
Balkan communities the necessity to know, understand, and cooperate with each other 
(Budimir & Skok 1934: 24-25). 
This Balkanological manifesto was not only the irst of its kind. But also, later-
day Balkanistics would have, as it turned out, little to add to the theoretical and 
methodological conceptualization of the ield. Balkan comparatism, as conceived 
here, was not just a multi-disciplinary and problem-oriented exercise. It evolved in two 
interdependent directions: as a study of “mutual inluences” and exchange between 
national entities (‘transfer history’) and of “common Balkan traits” or “Balkan 
peculiarity” (‘transnational history’). Balkanology was meant to deal with the general, 
the syncretic – the “Balkan reality,” the “Balkan man,” the “Balkan organism” and 
its “characteristic laws” – not with the nationally speciic. It came up with a research 
agenda and a method aimed at a regional “synthesis drawing on the elements of 
Balkan interdependence and unity” (Papacostea 1938: vi). This, at the same time, 
did not undermine ethnic and national frameworks: the actual historical actors were, 
invariably and self-evidently, the Balkan peoples, if not always the Balkan states. 
Proceeding from the notion of ‘Balkan organicity’ and the Balkanological 
‘curriculum’ of his Yugoslav predecessors, the founder of the Bucharest-based 
Institute for Balkan Studies and Research in 1937, Romanian medievalist Victor 
Papacostea (1900-1962), left us perhaps the most radical assertion of what he called 
the “impossibility of studying the life of any Balkan people separately” and of the 
imperative for a transnational and multidisciplinary approach to the past of this part 
of Europe (Papacostea 1996, 1938, 1943). “Determined in its investigations by the 
frontiers ixed by geography and history, Balkanology,” Papacostea re-afirmed, 
“aims at revealing the characteristic laws and circumstances, under whose operation 
there has developed, century after century, the life of the Balkan peoples, in its whole 
and for each of them.” More radically however, Papacostea considered the adoption 
or forced imposition of the very idea of the nation-state, one that was “created in the 
West and for the West,” to have had catastrophic consequences in the Balkans a region 
that, unlike Western Europe, was marked by a unity of economic geography, by “the 
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same community of culture and civilization born by long coexistence,” and by being 
“in the main subordinated to the same political systems and inluenced by the same 
currents of ideas.” Above all it was the “common ethnic base” and the “millennia-long 
mixture of races that has resulted, ever since antiquity, in the strongly relative value of 
the idea of nationality in the Balkans.”
Papacostea spoke instead of a “Balkan nationality” and “Balkan society” as well 
as of a “homo balcanicus” – a syncretic type deined by complex ethnogenesis, mental 
and spiritual structures and linked to, above and beyond his native and linguistic group, 
“the great Balkan community through organic links coming from a complex and 
lengthy ancestry.” Under such conditions the idea of nationality remained precarious 
and uncertain, “in reality a notion, not ethnic, but mostly political and cultural,” 
whereas one realized “how intensive the exchange of inluences among these peoples 
was and how easily important elements of culture and civilization passed from the 
one to the other. But above all: how misplaced and ridiculous appear the exaltation of 
national particularisms.”
One of the striking facts about this methodologically sophisticate regionalism that 
blossomed in the 1930s is the rehabilitation of the term (region) of the Balkans – to 
the extent that Papacostea, who, in the vein of Iorga, deeply disagreed with such a 
regional denomination, saw himself compelled to surrender to the impossibility of 
replacing it. There are, it seems, two major reasons, whose combined effect could help 
us explaining this trend. One was the ascendancy of the Nazi-German re-deinition 
and argumentation of Southeastern Europe as a geopolitical and economic space, 
distinct from the ‘historical Balkans,’ which exposed even more starkly than before 
the vulnerability of a small-state region. The other was the urge to counteract the, 
what Budimir and Skok dubbed, “general misunderstanding of all things Balkan” by 
asserting the existence of a unique Balkan world with a distinctive yet universally 
signiicant culture, and a peculiar Balkan man with his own spirituality and sensitivity.25 
Thus, as it happened, the same regionalist scholars operated, in parallel if not in the 
same texts, on another ‘Balkanistic’ register, employing quasi-academic and meta-
historical arguments to underwrite a notion of ‘Balkanism’ closely replicating national 
autochthonism. 
More radically than Iorga, interwar Balkanologists ‘redeemed’ the region by 
pushing it into the symbolic space traditionally occupied by the nation. They embarked 
on vindicating the “strong and irreducible Balkan individuality,” which they saw as a 
token for the region’s “historic function” of mediating between the East and the West, 
the eastern and the western Mediterranean, the ancient and the modern world, and 
for its creative potential: “what it had generated by its own forces in order to lay it 
at the disposal of Europe” (Budimir & Skok 1934: 19). The tendencies of uniication 
and particularism were now transigured into “the two most precious elements” 
which “the Balkan man” had granted to human progress: “the spirit of independence 
[samosvojnost] (= individualism) and the spirit of association (= collectivism).” The 
25. It should be noted that the German Byzantine and Slavic studies of the previous decades, not solely 
local incentives towards such redefintion, had helped prepare the grounds for such a “rediscovery” 
of the Balkans.
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harmony of individualism and collectivism were said to be the hallmark of regional 
history since Antiquity. Unlike “Pax Romana” with its “uniform unity,” the Balkans of 
both the Byzantine and the Ottoman eras “tended towards unity in variations, a diverse 
unity.” “The varied commonality is more eficient and more durable than the uniform 
unity, the organized variety having, properly speaking, bigger ‘biological’ value than 
the unity without variations.” Thus, instead of treating it as a “European anomaly,” as 
the conventional Western wisdom had done, the Balkan diversity and “melting pot” 
were revalorized as a source of generative power: “All in all, the Balkans is the genuine 
cradle of humanism [čojstvo] and heroism. These are the principal characteristics of 
the Balkan mountaineer and also the true ideas of a sincere humanism. They had 
preserved the Balkan people [Balkanci; les Balkaniques] throughout all the centuries 
of grandeur and sufferance”. (Skok & Budimir 1936)
As to the ‘immanent’ regional violence, that proverbial Balkan vice, it was 
asserted to be utterly alien to the local tradition and imposed from the outside. It had 
made its inroads during the Balkan “Risorgimento,” when a major “re-orientation 
of the Balkan civilization” took place: the Oriental culture in its Islamic form gave 
way to the Western culture based on scientiic and technological progress. It was at 
this juncture that the Balkan scholars saw the source of a major historical regression: 
all previous civilizations – the Hellenistic, the Roman, the Byzantine, the Ottoman – 
had brought unity to the region, “while modern European culture during the Balkan 
Risorgimento, on the contrary, divided politically and morally the inhabitants of the 
Peninsula at the same time as it leveled them through its cultural inluence.” 
The culmination of this line of reasoning was the entreaty that “the Balkans itself 
should deine its proper cultural orientation … in view of creating on these bases 
a better common Balkan fatherland [patrie balkanique commune]…” Throughout 
all its great epochs the peninsula had had its authentic spiritual orientation, which 
made itself manifest in “a sort of homogeneity unique to the Peninsula.” Rather than 
spontaneously springing from an ancient tradition, however, such a “Balkan spirit” 
could take root among the peoples in the region only through the sustained efforts of 
the post-war generation. In conclusion,
This Balkan spirit demands irst of all that the whole spiritual and material 
civilization, such as it has emerged in the Balkans, should be envisaged, 
criticized and organized not in view of Western Europe but, above all, in view of 
the needs of the Balkan fatherland taken as one whole. (Skok & Budimir 1936)
So, a new authentic spirit, regenerated and elevated to a new level, a new sense 
of a pan-Balkan fatherland, a new Balkan culture based on a long-standing tradition 
of unity in diversity, regional self-reliance and self-suficiency – these were the key 
concepts on which the politics of the ‘new Balkan science’ were made to rest. 
All this resonates intimately with the prevailing ‘nativist’ currents and autarchic 
thrusts in nationalist political and intellectual thought of the late 1920s and the 1930s, 
captured by calls for resurgence of national authenticity and self-suficiency. It is telling 
that the impulse to transpose national autochthonism onto Balkan autochthonism had 
spilled far beyond the Balkanologist scholarly circle and had come to buttress different 
cultural-political projects. Thus the Bulgarian historian of culture Naiden Sheitanov 
pled for the resurgence of “the ancient-Balkanic” and “the Thraco-Balkanic,” as 
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epitomized by Orpheus and Dionysius, and for the creation thereby of “Thracianism 
as a culturally-regenerating direction” to the future of the Bulgarians (Sheitanov 
2006). Discussing the Balkan Christians’ awareness of “their civilizational Christian 
mission” and the existence on this basis of a Balkan “cultural and spiritual oecumene” 
during the late Middle Ages, the Croatian philosopher and ethno-psychologist 
Vladimir Dvorniković asserted that “already at that time there existed a ‘Balkan soul,’ 
only that it did not yet speak in a political language” (Dvorniković 1936). The Balkans 
in the cartography of the Bulgarian philosopher Janko Janev was not a geographical 
notion but a place that had become destiny: he saw it as the bridge to the “world-
historical becoming,” the zone where the fate of the West will be sealed (Janeff 1936: 
7-9). In an interesting inversion of Iorga’s symbolic map of extra-regional orientations 
and Cvijić’s stigmatic characterology of the Bulgarians’ immanent Balkanness, Janev 
identiied only the Bulgarians and to some extent the Serbs, by virtue of their jovial 
archaic disposition, as the par excellence Balkanites and authentic Balkan peoples, 
whose “barbarity” boded their spectacular renaissance.26 The Serbian poet Rade 
Drainac came up with a “Manifesto of the Balkan Culture” bitterly attacking the 
“inhuman Western culture,” the “soulless industrialism” and “radical realism” of the 
West, which threatened to “kill the human soul and will destroy humankind.” He 
appealed for the creation of a “new civilization” and a “more humane culture – a 
Balkan culture,” marked by “superior ethics” and “more humane morality,” by way of 
“boycotting forever the systems [promoting] materialistic and mechanic worldviews” 
(Drainac 1931).27
The Balkan scholars did not as a rule go that far in their anti-Western rhetoric. 
But the similarity in binaries (the materialistic/inhuman West vs. the spiritual/humane 
Balkans), concepts (independence, ethics, regeneration, mission) and orientation is 
signiicant. As are the differences: rather than insisting on safeguarding the Balkans 
from the “contaminated West” by surrounding it with a Chinese wall, as Drainac did, 
the Balkanists proposed to “save”  civilization by fertilizing the West’s technical 
progress with the Balkans’ spirituality and humane ingenuity:
The empire of Americanism and technique cannot be maintained unless it 
concludes a durable union with the empire of humanism and the spirit, whose 
thrones had been occupied by so many sons of the Balkan land, a mountainous 
source of cosmic and human forces. One of the Balkan destinies resides, it 
seems, in that these peoples could also lay down the conditions for a harmonic 
fusion of Americanism and humanism, a harmony which the present-day 
humankind clearly feels a need for”. (Skok & Budimir 1936: 612-13)
In many ways the regional level in the writings of that time exhibits the features 
of methodological nationalism – a sort of national autochthonism writ large. For some 
26. According to Janev, the Romanians were alien to the Balkan spirit by virtue of their “a-national” 
intelligentsia which served politically the French; the Turks had no historical roots in the region; 
while the Greeks had lost their one-time specificity being neither Apolonic nor Orphic (Janeff 
1936: 117-118).
27. The manifesto was dispatched to and published by a number of newspapers in the region and 
beyond.
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this was a reaction to the awareness of frail state sovereignty; for others, an exertion 
to combat the nation’s symbolic underdog position by the proxy of regional dignity. 
Some extrapolated the national ontology and organicity onto the region, others 
assimilated the region’s “cosmic” forces, mythical substrata and “world-historical 
vocation” into the national discourse. The upsurge of regional schemes during the 
interwar period is related to a certain anti-hegemonistic resistance which, ironically, 
made itself manifest in both autochthonist and regionalist directions. The striking 
common feature of both, however, was the complete volte-face which the valency 
of the Balkans – and of being Balkan – had undergone in the 1930s. This new notion 
of Balkanness endeavored, and apparently succeeded, to indigenize and devour the 
historical teleology and the cultural mission of Europeanness.
Conclusions
A striking common feature of the supranational projects discussed here, and others 
which were not discussed, is the ambiguous entanglement of the national and the 
transnational: these projects could erode but also buttress national differences. For 
none of our scholars did the “Balkan idea” imply obliteration of the national; at the 
same time none deemed it to be just the sum total of its constitutive nation-states. No 
one expressed this ambiguity better than Iorga:
On parle aujourd’hui très souvent, presque à toute occasion, d’un 
internationalisme, qui ne signiie en fait que s’entre tolérer […] Ce qu’il faut 
c’est autre chose : revenir par l’interpénétrations aux vieilles unités morales. 
Pour cela, il n’y a rien à sacriier dans ce qui nous est le plus cher. Les nations 
sont des organes ayant leur rôle autonome, mais ceci ne dénie pas la nécessité 
de l’organisme unitaire, qui vit d’autant mieux si cette autonomie se conserve 
saine et pure. (Iorga 1929 : 136) 
The very relationship of the “organs” to “organism,” on the other hand, 
considerably changed the understanding of the national. The nation-centered paradigm 
was strongly relativized when ensconced in the ‘supranational’ cultural-historical 
environment of the region. The Balkanologists sought to reformulate the nationalist 
semantic framework whereby the proper understanding of one’s nationality and true 
patriotism would entail the acknowledgment for their transnational embedment. “Our 
patriotism, if it wants to be real, should be a Balkan patriotism,” asserted the founders 
of the Belgrade Balkan Institute (Parežanin & Spanaćević 1936: 321). In many ways 
that was a ‘methodologically national’ regionalism: the Balkans was envisioned as 
an overarching quasi-nation, and Balkanness as the quintessence of the unique and 
deep-seated ethno-cultural and ethno-psychological traits of the national character. In 
the heyday of European nationalism, national autochthonism and Balkan regionalism 
were as closely fused as they had never been before or after that. 
A sense of geopolitical vulnerability had much to do with all that: transposing or 
relegating sovereignty on the region was seen as a way of offsetting the impotence of 
small statehood in the geopolitical ambiance especially of the 1930s. “The Balkans to 
the Balkan peoples” was an age-old outcry against both imperialist encroachment and 
intraregional strife. But these were political contingencies which, next to the low level 
of institutionalization of regional studies relative to the nation-centered disciplinary 
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canons, boded badly for the establishment of a continuous – stable and strong – 
tradition of Balkanology. 
Yet, as this essay has attempted to intimate, it is not enough to evaluate the politics 
of ‘Balkan science’ in view of its lost battle against methodological and geopolitical 
nationalism. On a certain level, the region provided a frame for posing critical 
questions about modernity and negotiating the nation’s relationship to the trans-
national cultural, social and economic processes. The discourse of regionalism, in 
this sense, provided the symbolic language to think about identity and change. On 
another level, these supranational constructs bring up the issue of the categories we 
can convincingly use in conceptualizing space beyond the nation-state – a question 
not answered yet in empirical if not theoretical sense. Here, again, the concepts of the 
Balkans which had emerged since the late 19th century have some meaningful things 
to tell us. It is hackneyed and unproductive to see them as simply the manifestations 
of small-culture syndrome or responses to western Balkanism. Present-day analysts 
dealing with these issues would do better to take them seriously, in their own terms 
and right. 
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